the physics of mind

The information process of brain is a quasi-deterministic process. To think it as a linear system is due to our preference for simplicity. The linear property is easy to declare verbally and be treated as a rule without the further doubt. However, the truth should not be so convenient for our mind. We can get a lot of results if we follow this type of thinking. The drawback of this thought is that it is still an empirical method, and is far from the scientific theory.
Science is not about the appearance of the world what we see and hear. The well-established theories of science are usually deviated from our sensation. Most of the time we cannot  see or experience the world described by the theory of science, but it has a huge power for prediction when the conditions are detailed.
We use our mind to study the mind. It is not necessary to assume that the mind itself is like our feeling of the mind. We think we know our mind because we are so familiar to it. However, what if our mind is just an interface of the complex system unknown to us?
Introspect won't help. If it does, why need a group of people who call themselves neuroscientist? The great philosopher or the great writer would have cracked the mystery of mind hundreds of year ago. Now what we are doing is probably just to follow their route. With a large amount of data, we introspect, think, and meditate. We are so obsessed with our mind. We like ourselves.
It is time to drop the power of mind. It is time to use the tool of science. The omnipotent maths and physics are the right tools we should take advantage of. We are stupid, but the logic of science is not.
Go, read this paper!

On some unwarranted tacit assumptions in cognitive neuroscience.

Mausfeld R.

Source

Department of Psychology, Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel, Institut für Psychologie Kiel, Germany.

Abstract

The cognitive neurosciences are based on the idea that the level of neurons or neural networks constitutes a privileged level of analysis for the explanation of mental phenomena. This paper brings to mind several arguments to the effect that this presumption is ill-conceived and unwarranted in light of what is currently understood about the physical principles underlying mental achievements. It then scrutinizes the question why such conceptions are nevertheless currently prevailing in many areas of psychology. The paper argues that corresponding conceptions are rooted in four different aspects of our common-sense conception of mental phenomena and their explanation, which are illegitimately transferred to scientific enquiry. These four aspects pertain to the notion of explanation, to conceptions about which mental phenomena are singled out for enquiry, to an inductivist epistemology, and, in the wake of behavioristic conceptions, to a bias favoring investigations of input-output relations at the expense of enquiries into internal principles. To the extent that the cognitive neurosciences methodologically adhere to these tacit assumptions, they are prone to turn into a largely a-theoretical and data-driven endeavor while at the same time enhancing the prospects for receiving widespread public appreciation of their empirical findings.